The Role of Performance Measures in the Intertemporal Decisions of
Business Unit Managers
Introduction
Business unit managers make decisions on a daily basis that have intertemporal consequences for areas as disparate as investments, employee training, and strategy. In these decisions, the course of action that is best in the short term may not be best over the long run (Laverty 1996) . Some researchers point an accusatory finger at accounting performance measures and argue that because accounting performance is measured over too brief a period the use of such measures will distort intertemporal decision-making by managers (Kaplan 1984; Merchant and Bruns 1986; Johnson and Kaplan 1987; Ittner, Larcker and Randall 2003 ).
But will they? Even if one concedes that accounting performance measures are intrinsically near-sighted, it does not follow that managers are also near-sighted (Larcker 2003; Hodak 2005) . It is not ultimately the idiosyncratic traits of accounting that matter, but how managers behave when using these performance measures. And yet few researchers have explored how the choice of accounting measure influences managerial time horizon. What's more, prior work tends to characterize managerial focus on the short run as "myopia," which is considered tantamount to opportunistic behavior (Narayanan 1985; Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa 1986; Rumelt 1987; Stein 1988; Thakor 1990; Murphy and Zimmerman 1993; Song and Thakor 2006) . Similarly, the impact of accounting performance measures on managerial time horizon is usually investigated in the context of dysfunctional behavior (Merchant 1989 (Merchant , 1990 Chow, Kato and Merchant 1996; Van der Stede 2000) . This approach, however, ignores the possibility that senior managers craft performance measures that provide business unit managers with incentives to make value-maximizing decisions and to refrain from making intertemporal choices that dissipate wealth by focusing too much on either the short term or the long run. Thus, if one observes managers who spend most of their time on short-run activities, it might well be that this is simply optimal in the present context and in fact the outcome of deliberate contract design.
Consequently, we view the time horizons of managers as an equilibrium outcome that reflects the objectives of the firm as well as managerial incentives and (possibly myopic) preferences. Our objective, then, is to explore how accounting and non-financial measures of performance are associated with the time horizon of managers. We do not assume that the attention given to the short run is suboptimal nor do we postulate that accounting measures inherently distort intertemporal decision-making.
We investigate the role of aggregated accounting measures, namely accounting return (return on investments, return on assets, residual income) and profit measures, as well as more disaggregated costs and sales measures. The non-financial category includes quantitative measures related to efficiency (lead time, % waste reduction, input-output ratios), quality (% on time completion, % warranty returns), and projects (project failure rates, project progress, achievement of targets). We examine the weight placed on each of these measures in the periodic evaluation of business unit managers by their superiors. We compare the percentage of time managers spend on activities that will show up within the quarterly reporting period relative to the time managers spend on activities with a financial impact beyond the quarterly reporting period.
Theory suggests that accounting return measures, disaggregated measures, and nonfinancial measures are used to supplement profit measures for evaluating business unit managers when profits induce too-costly myopic behavior (Lambert 2001) . The key insight from theory is that these alternative measures counterbalance myopic actions by motivating managers to undertake activities that have an effect on long-run firm value.
Earlier theoretical and empirical work suggests that accounting return measures are particularly suited for this goal as they "bring the future forward" 1 to a greater extent than do profit measures (Reichelstein 1997; Rogerson 1997; Dutta 2003; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003) . Accounting return measures implicitly (e.g., return on investment) or explicitly (e.g., residual income) include the cost of capital and thus capture the effect of investment decisions. 2 The inclusion of the cost of capital creates incentives for managers to make decisions that are optimal in the longer term. We thus expect these measures to be associated with managers spending more time on activities that have long term consequences.
We expect both disaggregated accounting measures, such as costs and sales, and nonfinancial measures to work in very much the same way. Extant work finds that these measures can discourage managers from "stealing from tomorrow" (Hodak 2005) , i.e., taking actions in the short run to the detriment of the long-term interests of the firm (Hemmer 1996; Ittner and Larcker 1998a; Dikolli 2001; Smith 2002; Sedatole, Kulp and Dikolli 2003; Dikolli and Vaysman 2006; Bouwens and van Lent 2007) . 3 We use survey data collected from a sample of 105 business unit managers with profit responsibility. We use business unit managers as our unit of analysis for two reasons.
First, the intertemporal decisions of business unit managers are likely to have a significant effect on firm value. Business unit managers generally are responsible for workforce training, technology investment, and development of new products and markets, all of which involve weighing short-run and long-run interests. It is therefore likely that firms care about the time horizon of their business unit managers and design performance measurement systems that guide managers in making optimal decisions. Second, we are interested in understanding how senior management designs control systems to align the interests of lower-level managers with the firm's objective function. The variety of control system choices at the business unit level (e.g., delegation of authority, incentive compensation, use of performance measures) is substantial (Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 1995; Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Abernethy, 2 In theory, return on investment (ROI) and residual income (RI) may have very different incentive effects. Indeed, in earlier decades the debate between proponents of each of these measures was heated. In contrast to this mostly normative debate, recent empirical work has not been able to show consistent differences in the incentive effects of either measure (see, e.g., Bouwens and van Lent (2007) ). We consider both as imperfect proxies for "economic profit." 3 Although some authors argue that these measures are employed to direct the attention of business unit managers to certain problem areas that need immediate attention (Ittner and Larcker 2002 ). Bouwens and van Lent 2004; Roberts 2004) . We can therefore expect to find sufficient variation in firm practice to test our predictions.
We follow a multi-pronged data collection strategy in which we capture our constructs of interest using more than one survey-based measure, solicit "harder" or more objective data instead of relying on perceptions, and use an estimation procedure (partial least squares) that deals explicitly with measurement error problems in relatively small samples (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 1997; Ittner and Larcker 2001; Bouwens and van Lent 2007) .
Our findings indicate that accounting return measures are associated with a longerterm managerial focus. We also find that cost (but not sales) measures and non-financial measures result in a longer-term orientation. While all of these measures can be used to supplement profit measures if managers act too myopically, we find that accounting return measures on the one hand and disaggregated and non-financial measures on the other hand are not equally effective in directing the attention of managers away from the short run. Time horizons are more strongly affected by accounting return measures than by non-financial and cost measures. We find no evidence that revenue measures influence time horizons. Our findings highlight the versatility of accounting performance measures (including disaggregated measures) and non-financial measures in focusing the attention of managers on activities that affect the financial performance of the firm beyond the current quarterly reporting period.
Hypotheses development
We base our hypotheses on recent work in multi-action agency models (Lambert 2001 ). These models lend themselves to interpretations of intertemporal choice and emphasize the role of performance measures. The agent (business unit manager) can be thought of as allocating effort between activities that affect firm value immediately and those that affect firm value in the long term. The problem for senior management is to pick performance measures that minimize intertemporal decision problems, motivate the desired total level of effort, and guide business unit managers to allocate the desired amount of effort over activities that affect both short-and long-term value.
Two aspects of performance measures matter in equilibrium: congruity and sensitivity/precision (Banker and Datar 1989; Feltham and Xie 1994; Datar, Kulp and Lambert 2001) . Congruity is the degree to which a performance measure captures the value impact of an agent's actions. A performance measure will have low congruity if managerial decisions improve the performance measure but hurt firm value (e.g., a profit measure that does not reflect the potential benefits of capital investments). Sensitivity refers to the degree to which the mean of a performance measure moves in response to an action by the manager, and precision reflects the noise or variance associated with the performance measure.
Sensitivity and precision matter because they will affect the intensity of the incentives provided to the agent. The (relative) weight on a performance measure, therefore, is a function of congruity and sensitivity/precision.
In the context of intertemporal decisions, we are interested in congruity problems that arise because a performance measure does not immediately reflect the long-term impact of the actions of business unit managers (or, conversely, overly emphasizes the long run at the expense of the short run). Lambert (2001) argues that one solution to congruity problems in a performance measure is to supplement the existing "incomplete" measure with another performance metric that is more sensitive to the business unit manager's desired action. To do this requires measures that are incongruent in the opposite way to the existing measures so that performance measurement on balance is as congruent as possible. However, little is known about the direction of the congruity of performance measures, particularly when it concerns motivating or deterring myopic behavior (Lambert 2001, p. 39) . Our objective is to explore the direction of congruity of performance measures in an effort to help explain the choices senior management make when designing the performance measurement system. 4 In the context of our setting, all business unit managers are evaluated on profit measures. We therefore investigate how alternative measures can balance out any potential incongruity problems associated with the profit measure.
Accounting return measures are believed to be highly congruous, because they provide a measure of economic value generated from specified resources and are thus a reasonable proxy for firm value creation (Scapens 1979; Zimmerman 1997; Anthony and Govindarajan 2004) . Their usefulness as a measure lies in their "completeness" and in their ability to focus managers' attention on the longer term. They capture the financial effects of all decisions made by a business unit and implicitly or explicitly incorporate the firm's cost of capital. 5 As such, they provide managers with incentives to consider the future consequences of current investments. There is strong theoretical support for the use of such measures in motivating long-term investments (Reichelstein 1997; Rogerson 1997; Dutta and Reichelstein 2002; Dutta 2003) . 6 Lambert (2001) draws on these studies and argues that measures that incorporate a firm's cost of capital can motivate agents to invest optimally regardless of the agent's time preferences or utility function. There is some limited empirical evidence consistent with this prediction. Wallace (1997) shows that companies adopting an accounting return measure that incorporates the cost of capital make investment decisions that are more aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders. Although this is not the same as documenting that accounting return measures direct the attention of managers to longer-term activities, it does provide us with some empirical evidence that intertemporal decisions may be affected by return measures. In addition, Bouwens and van Lent (2007) provide evidence that accounting return measures "provide not only information about how well resources are used, but also incentives that encourage optimal resource use" (p. 670).
On an intuitive level, then, the use of accounting return measures focuses managers' attention on the impact of investment decisions on financial statements in the longer term. 5 It appears to be common practice to use return on assets or return on equity in relation to a firm's cost of capital when evaluating a business unit manager's performance; see, for example, Solomons (1965) for early evidence. 6 There is also some case-based evidence. Hodak (2005) describes the use of an economic profit (i.e., accounting-return-based) plan at Nucor that operated with great success between 1965-2000. Nucor went through several years in the late 1980s with flat profits as they were building their first revolutionary mini-mill. The firm used its accounting-return-based incentive plan to motivate management to make the required investments and forgo its annual bonuses for some time. Due to the plans stability, it remained virtually unchanged for more than 35 years, managers did not consider their annual bonus plan to be a short-term plan. To these managers, as the plan provided "accountability for new capital," it rewarded long term performance (Hodak 2005, p. 122) .
Therefore, we expect that the use of accounting returns motivates business unit managers to shift their attention away from the short term and toward the long term.
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H :
There will be a shift in the amount of time a business unit manager spends on activities with a short horizon towards activities with a longer horizon as the weight on accounting return measures increases.
We predict that non-financial measures and disaggregated costs and sales measures have very similar effects on the time horizons of managers. The main benefit of these measures is that they are leading indicators of future performance (Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt 1994; Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn 1996; Ittner et al. 1997; Ittner and Larcker 1998a; Banker, Potter and Srinivasan 2000; Sedatole 2003; Bryant, Jones and Widener 2004; Ittner and Larcker 2005) and thus can improve contracting efficiency and motivate managers to undertake actions with longer-term consequences. The defining quality of these measures is that they can be tailored to measure specific activities that are known to be important in the longer term. For example, senior management can use "sales growth in new markets" as a disaggregated measure that focuses the manager's attention on activities that are necessary for the long-run viability of the firm. Indeed, since "the future" (i.e., the long term consequences)
can be "brought forward" by these measures, such activities are more likely to receive the proper attention (Dikolli 2001) . Thus, it is not the case that costs and sales measures are merely the bookkeeping components of overall profit. Precisely because senior management use their knowledge of the business model of the firm to identify disaggregated measures that are informative about key value drivers, such measures can change managerial time horizons.
In addition, accounting profit is a linear (equally weighted) aggregation of revenues and costs (in dollars). Evidence from field studies suggests that senior management may feel that problems with expenses or sales in the current period could show up as a much more significant problem in the future (Merchant 1989) . By focusing on specific expenses or revenues rather than aggregated profit, senior management can assign a higher weight to these measures when evaluating managers. As such, the measures will command more managerial attention.
There is, however, no evidence of a causal link between firm value and non-financial or disaggregated measures. Indeed, there is considerable risk that managers will continue to expend effort on actions that do not produce the desired gain in firm value. For example, if improving employee quality is a strategic goal and the firm uses the number of hours engaged in training as a performance measure, then business unit managers may allocate too much effort to training employees, which in turn harms firm value. Ittner and Larcker (1998a) demonstrate that motivating managers to improve satisfaction scores is only value-increasing within a limited range. Hodak (2005) reports the case of a company that rewarded its executives almost exclusively based on sales growth. The firm succeeded in achieving higher sales, but profits plummeted: "it became clear how many clever ways a determined employee could 'buy' sales and undermine profits" (p. 117).
In sum, while non-financial measures and disaggregated measures can be useful in promoting actions with longer-term impact by providing a timely signal about the effect of an action on firm value, there is no guarantee that improving performance based on a particular measure benefits firm value (Hemmer 1996; Thevaranjan, Joseph and Srinivasan 2000; Smith 2002 ). Such measures are not as congruous as accounting return measures and thus should not be as effective in balancing out any "myopic" proclivities associated with profit measures.
This raises a question as to why firms do not use accounting return measures exclusively. The answer comes from the two other determinants of the use of performance measures: precision and sensitivity. Accounting return measures are often thought to be relatively coarse and "too far removed" from the daily activities of managers. Disaggregated accounting measures and non-financial measures are likely to be superior in terms of precision and sensitivity. 7 This leads to the following predictions:
7 Note that since we are using the weight on a performance measure as an independent variable in our empirical analysis, we are not concerned that some firms may rely more on certain measures not because of their congruity properties (in which we are interested) but because of their noise/sensitivity (which we do not care about when explaining time horizons). Indeed, as we are not trying to explain the weight on a performance measure, but the effect of using a performance measure on time horizon, our hypothesis can be based on congruity arguments only.
H :
There will be a shift in the amount of time a business unit manager spends on activities with a short horizon towards activities with a longer horizon as the weight on non-financial measures increases.
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There will be a shift in the amount of time a business unit manager spends on activities with a short horizon towards activities with a longer horizon as the weight on disaggregated accounting measures increases.
H :
Accounting return measures will be more effective than either nonfinancial measures or disaggregated measures in changing the time horizon of business unit managers from the short term to the longer term.
We do not develop arguments relating to the use of profit as a performance measure.
All business unit managers in this study have profit responsibility and thus are evaluated based on profits. In the spirit of Lambert (2001), we are interested in understanding the role of "other" measures in solving the congruity problems associated with intertemporal decisions.
Full model, sample selection, measurement of variables, and model estimation

Full model
We argue that the time horizon of business unit managers depends on the performance measures used for evaluation. Much prior research has established that the weight on a performance measure is, in turn, a function of many organizational design variables (Bushman et al. 1995; Ittner et al. 1997; Keating 1997; Abernethy et al. 2004; Bouwens and van Lent 2007) . In particular, the literature suggests that pay-for-performance sensitivity and the degree of decentralization are important factors and that these factors, in turn, are a function of the information asymmetry between business unit managers and their superiors (Baiman, Larcker and Rajan 1995; Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman 1997) . We control for the potential confounding effects of these (indirect) determinants of the use of performance measures by including them as control variables in our model following Wooldridge (2002) . 8 We further control for factors that are likely to draw a manager's attention to the short run: current performance, growth opportunities, industry, size of the business unit, and the degree of competition (Laverty 1996) .
Sample selection
We collect data by randomly selecting from a database that contains the addresses of firms domiciled in a West European country. Our unit of analysis is the lowest-level manager with full profit responsibilities. By choosing profit-responsible managers, we increase the probability that our respondents make non-trivial intertemporal decisions. Regardless of firm structure, we refer to these managers as "business unit managers." We use an intensive, personal approach to obtain the firm's commitment to participate in the study. 9 From our initial sample of 160 firms with more than 100 employees (to ensure the presence of multiple business unit managers who report to a higher-level superior), 105 managers agreed to be included in the study (a response rate of 65%). We made appointments with the business unit managers and used student teams to collect the data using a structured questionnaire format.
We use student teams to ensure that we have data from managers at the appropriate level (i.e., the business unit manager) and to increase the response rate. 10 The students were carefully briefed to ensure that there was no opportunity for interviewer bias to occur. We test for nonresponse bias by using financial statement data from both sample firms and firms that did not agree to participate. Untabulated results indicate that there is no significant difference between the respondents and non-respondents in terms of firm size (measured by total sales) and industry.
11 9 Specifically, we send an introduction letter to the target firms with information about the study and the investigators. One of the authors then conducted a follow-up telephone call with a top level manager in the company, sometimes followed by a site visit. In many cases, multiple calls were necessary to obtain sponsorship from top management. We then ask the firm to identify three profitresponsible managers, from which we randomly choose one to be visited by our student team. Participating firms were invited to a workshop in which the authors presented the results of the study.
Respondents received a small gift in acknowledgment of their time (in most cases, a practitioneroriented book on management). 10 Compared to mail surveys, face-to-face interviews have several advantages. Interviews increase the willingness of respondents to take the survey serious; they provide assurance that the intended respondent indeed answers the questions (instead of a junior employee or secretary), and they offer the possibility to clarify questions that confuse the respondent. 11 In many cases, we had to guarantee anonymity to participating firms. The student teams returned the completed questionnaires without any firm-identifying information. The drawback of this procedure is Table 2 average. Almost 60% have a university education.
Variable measurement
The Appendix reproduces the questionnaire instrument used to measure the variables included in this study.
Main Variables
Time horizon. We use an instrument originally developed by Lawrence and Lorch (1967) and adapted by Merchant (1990) to measure time horizon. Respondents are given six time periods and asked to indicate how much time, in percentage terms, they devote to activities within each time period with the total equaling 100%. The time periods include the following categories: 1) one month or less, 2) one month to three months 3) three months to a year, 4) one to two years, 5) two to three years, and 6) three to five years. We group the responses into three relevant accounting time periods: within the first quarterly reporting period (the sum of categories 1 and 2) and within the annual reporting period (category 3), and beyond the annual reporting period (the sum of categories 4, 5, and 6). We label these short, medium, and that we cannot combine survey data with publicly available information. We judged the benefit of having a high response rate to outweigh these costs. 12 To test whether our findings are sensitive to the inclusion of small business units, we run all analyses on a sub-sample of units with at least 15 employees. This does not change our coefficient estimates in any meaningful way and significance generally improves, albeit marginally. Note that we control in all regressions for the size of the unit.
long horizons, respectively. This distinction allows us to test our hypothesis that accounting return measures are more effective than either non-financial measures or disaggregated accounting measures in changing the time horizon of managers. Thus, if a performance measure is positively associated with a long horizon and not with a medium horizon, we call that measure "more effective" in changing managerial time horizons.
We test for convergent validity of our time allocation variable by computing correlations between our three horizon constructs and the respondents' answers to an alternative item in the questionnaire. Following Merchant (1990) , we ask respondents to indicate how they allocate their time over six different categories of activities: 1) new product development, 2) improvement of existing products/services, 3) adjusting/improving production processes, 4) employee development, 5) the execution of current production processes, and 6) advertising and sales promotion. We find strong, positive correlations (pvalue < 1%) between activities that typically represent short-horizon concerns (i.e., categories 5 and 6). We also find strong, positive correlations (p-value < 1%) between our long-horizon construct and categories 1-4. These findings support the validity of our time horizon construct.
13
Our instrument measures time horizon as a proportion of total available time, which implies that the proportions are subject to the obvious constraint that they have to sum to 100%. The statistical analysis of this type of "compositional" data is not without complications, which we discuss below. Aitchison (1986) , which measure the shift in time horizon from short-term towards long-term activities and from short-term towards medium-term activities, respectively. These two log-ratios completely specify the composition of the vector of time 13 We obtain very similar results if we define short horizon as category 1, medium horizon as category 3, and long horizon as category 6. Respondents frequently report no weight on a specific category, which is problematic when computing log-ratios because division by zero and the logarithm of zero are both unspecified.
Thus, we need to reduce the number of zeros as values of the time allocation variable. Amalgamation (combining categories) is a preferred way to do this (Aitchison 1986; Fry, Fry and McLaren 1996) . Remaining cases of zeros after amalgamation are treated according to the zero replacement procedure outlined in Aitchison (1986) . 
δ is the maximum rounding-off error. 15 We also include qualitative measures relating to leadership and personal measures. Within our sample, however, very few managers report that these measures are used to evaluate their performance and we drop them from the subsequent analysis. From presurvey tests of the questions, it appeared that stock price related measures play in our setting no role in the annual performance evaluation of business unit managers and we dropped this category from our instrument following the recommendations in Fowler (1995) .
does not sum to a constant across respondents. 16 We combine efficiency, quality, and project measures to form the non-financial measure. We use a combination of these measures because the use of each specific non-financial metric varies considerably over firms (and many firms do not use each measure). This is expected since non-financial measures are supposed to be geared to the unique circumstances a business unit faces. We thus include many categories of possible non-financial measures in an effort to provide relevant performance measure descriptions to all respondents. However, to the extent that the different types of non-financial measures have different effects on managerial time horizon, our variable will contain measurement error, which may cause a bias.
Our instrument avoids several known psychometric problems compared with instruments based on Likert scales (Ittner and Larcker 2001) . For example, we specify the decision context in which a measure is used (periodic performance evaluation); we ask for the actual weight placed on a measure in the performance evaluation rather than determining its use by Likert scales; and we do not force managers to rank measures that are equally important. As a further validity check, we ask managers to provide us with details of the use of a performance measure in their bonus contract (if available). We then compute correlations between the weight of the measure for bonus purposes and its weight for periodic performance evaluation. We find that the two uses are highly correlated (corr. > 0.35; p-value < 0.01 for all variables), which may alleviate potential concerns about the validity of our construct.
Control Variables
We control for variables that may confound the relations among the main variables as explained in Section 3.1. The measures are based on prior literature that provides evidence of the strength of their psychometric properties. We provide summary statistics on the manifest indicators of each of the latent constructs in Table 3 . Our estimation method (see below)
provides us with additional evidence of the measurement properties of our multi-item 16 When we estimate our regressions we do not include the "weight on other performance measures" in an effort to reduce potential collinearity problems, consistent with earlier work (see, e.g., White, Varadarajan and Dacin 2003) .
instruments. We report statistics on internal consistency, measurement error, and discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981) in Table 4 . Taken together with the Cronbach's alpha (also reported in Table 4 ), the results validate the inclusion of the variables in the subsequent regression models.
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We use an instrument adapted from Gordon and Narayanan (1984) Vancil (1978) . We find that the correlation between the two measures is 0.39 (p-value <
0.01).
Size is captured using the natural log of the number of employees that work in the business unit. Information asymmetry is measured based on Dunk's (1993) six-item measure that compares the business unit manager's knowledge to that of the superior. 18 We test the convergent validity of the measure by computing correlations with variables that proxy for the accumulated experience of the respondent (i.e., age and experience in the current position).
The results show that our measure of information asymmetry displays good convergent validity. 19 Current performance is measured using a three-item instrument that asks respondents to rate their performance relative to their targets and the performance of their peers at comparable units. Growth opportunities of the business unit are measured using a two-item instrument described in Abernethy et al. (2004) and used by Bouwens and van Lent 17 We also compute the "cross loadings" between manifest and latent variables to check whether our manifest variables load properly on the latent variable they are associated with and not on other latent variables. Untabulated results (available on request) show that this is the case in our sample. 18 The results from the measurement model suggest that we drop one of the original items. We continue our analysis with a latent construct that consists of five indicators. estimation, which has better finite-sample properties than comparable covariance-based full information estimation procedures (such as LISREL) (Chin and Newsted 1999) .
PLS simultaneously models the structural paths (i.e., the theoretical relations among latent variables) and measurement paths (i.e., the relation between a latent variable and its indicators). Rather than assume equal weights for all indicators of a scale, the PLS algorithm allows each indicator to vary in how much it contributes to the composite score of the latent variable. Indicators with weaker relations to related indicators and the latent variable are given lower weightings (Chin, Marcolin and Newsted 2003) . PLS estimation segments models into separate subsets of latent variables and measures related to that latent variable or adjacent latent variables. Estimation then proceeds in an iterative manner whereby a set of model parameters is estimated by ordinary least squares, with the values of parameters in other subsets taken as a given. Due to the compositional nature of our (log-ratio) dependent variables, however, Aitchison (1986) suggests estimating seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) to account for the distributional dependence between the log-ratios. We follow this suggestion, but compute standard errors using a bootstrapping procedure (1,000 samples with replacement where all samples have the same size as the original sample).
Results
We first discuss the summary statistics for our main variables as reported in Table 2 .
Pearson correlations among our variables are reported in Table 4 . Finally, Table 5 presents the estimation results of the PLS regressions examining the association between the time horizon of business unit managers and the weight placed on different types of performance measures.
Summary statistics
Our respondents report that they spend on average 46% of their time on short horizon activities (median = 45%), although some managers spend all of their time on activities that affect the profit-and-loss statement within the quarterly reporting period (in Table 2 , Panel A).
Median-and long-horizon activities receive an average of 24% and 29% of the manager's time, respectively. Again, there is substantial variation in the way in which managers spend their time (standard deviation is about 20% for both medium-and long-horizon activities).
As expected for profit-responsible managers, profit measures receive the most weight (on average) in the performance evaluation of our respondents. Compared with the next-mostimportant measure (non-financials), profits receive on average a 30.5% weight (median = 25.0%), while the mean respondent reports that non-financial measures obtain a 19.4% weight (median = 20.0%). Disaggregated sales and costs measures are used to a lesser degree (on average, the weight is approximately 10%). Accounting return measures are used in a substantial subset of business units, but many firms do not use these measures which accounts for the low average weight of 3.7%. Specifically, Table 2 Panel B, shows that 20 respondents (19% of the sample) report they are evaluated on accounting return measures, whereas profit and non-financial measures are used in 82% and 76% of the sample business units, respectively. Table 4 presents the Pearson correlations among the variables in our study. We find that the weight on accounting return measures is positively (but weakly) associated with both the long/short log-ratios and the medium/short log-ratios, which indicates that managers shift from short-towards longer-horizon activities with higher weights on accounting return measures. Profit measures, on the other hand, are negatively associated with these two ratios, which indicates an opposite shift in relative time allocation (i.e., towards the short horizon).
Non-financial measures and cost measures have similar relations with time allocation. Both are positively correlated with the long/short log-ratio and medium/short log-ratios, suggesting a shift in time allocation towards longer-horizon activities. Finally, sales measures appear to be negatively associated with both log-ratios implying that the time allocation shifts towards the short horizon when these measures are used. Together, these correlations provide some initial support for our hypotheses. In addition, they validate the importance of controlling for organizational design and other factors that earlier studies have found to influence time horizons and the use of performance measures.
Full model results
Hypothesis H1 addresses the influence of accounting return measures on time horizon. We find support for a shift from a short horizon towards longer horizons as predicted in H1. Table 5 provides the details. The estimated coefficient of the path between the weight on accounting return measures and the medium/short log-ratio is 0.16, with a p-value equal to 0.01. We also find a positive estimated coefficient on the path between accounting return measures and the long/short log-ratio, which indicates that the shift in time horizon associated with these measures extends to periods beyond one-year (coefficient = 0.15, p-value = 0.02).
Earlier, we argued that non-financial measures and disaggregated accounting measures (costs and sales) behave in very similar ways. Hypotheses H2 and H3 formalize this expectation and predict that both measures are positively associated with the time managers spend on activities with a longer horizon. Table 5 shows that non-financial measures are indeed associated with the medium/short log-ratio which measures the shift from a short horizon towards a medium horizon. The coefficient on the path connecting the two constructs is 0.21 (p-value = 0.03). Similarly, we find a strong positive association between the weight placed on cost measures and the medium/short log-ratio (coefficient = 0.33, p-value = 0.00).
Only cost measures are (albeit weakly) associated with the long/short log-ratio, suggesting that costs, but not non-financial measures, are somewhat able to shift attention from shorthorizon towards long-horizon activities (coefficient on costs = 0.16, p-value = 0.07; coefficient on non-financial measures = 0.09, p-value = 0.20).
In contrast, sales measures do not appear to be able to direct the attention of managers away from the short-horizon activities.
The results also confirm hypothesis H4, in which we predict that accounting return measures will be more effective than disaggregated and non-financial measures in directing the attention of managers toward actions with longer-term implications. This is evident from the regression of the medium/long log-ratio onto the weight on different types of performance measures. We find that disaggregated (costs and sales) measures as well as non-financial measures are positively associated with this log-ratio, which implies that increasing the weight on these measures shifts the attention of managers away from the long run toward the medium horizon. The effect is particularly pronounced for costs and non-financial measures.
The coefficient on the path between the weight on cost measures and the medium/long logratio is 0.30 (p-value = 0.00). The coefficient on non-financial measures is 0.20 (p-value = 0.04), whereas the path between sales measures and the log-ratio obtains a coefficient of 0.13, which is weakly significant (p-value = 0.09). Accounting return measures do not appear to redirect managers away from long-run activities, consistent with our prediction.
Together, these findings provide strong support for our hypotheses, except in the case of sales measures. Table 5 also reports the coefficient estimates of the paths relating the two organizational design variables (decentralization and pay-for-performance sensitivity) to time horizon. We report these details because prior work has provided convincing evidence of their relation with the use of performance measures (and potentially with the time horizon). In our sample, however, decentralization and pay-for-performance sensitivity do not affect the time horizon of business unit managers, with the exception of the effect of the incentive system on shifting attention away from horizons beyond one year. This makes sense as the natural horizon of many compensation instruments is 12 months. A stronger association between performance and compensation creates incentivize for managers to deliver results within one year.
Untabulated results show that of the remaining control variables, only industry affiliation influences the time spent on activities with different horizons. We also include the weight on profit measures as a control variable as it is correlated with the weight on the other performance measure categories and its omission would bias our estimation. We have no prediction about the effect of profit measures on relative time horizon as all sample managers are routinely evaluated on profits and we explore how other performance measures are used to balance out any unwanted effect of profits. Indeed, we find no evidence that profit measures affect time horizon. Overall, the models have good explanatory power: the multiple 2 R varies between 22% and 35%.
Discussion, limitations, and conclusion
This paper sheds light on the widely held view that the use of traditional accounting performance measures "motivate dysfunctional behavior by causing managers to pay attention to the 'wrong' things" (Lambert 2001, p. 201) . Problems of myopia in intertemporal decisions dominate the rationale for the inclusion of non-financial measures in the design of performance measurement systems (Merchant and Bruns 1986; Ittner and Larcker 1998b; Thevaranjan et al. 2000) . We question whether accounting measures result in management myopia and argue that it depends on the choice of measure. We draw on Lambert's (2001) idea that senior management can "correct" for the incompleteness in one performance measure by adding another measure. The trick is to know the direction of bias of the first performance measure so that the "right" combination of measures can be selected. By examining how different types of accounting and non-financial measures influence the time horizon of managers, our results provide some insight into the "direction" associated with each performance measure. If a measure results in overly costly myopia (i.e., a short-term focus) senior management can select an alternative measure that directs managers' attention to the longer term.
We examine the use of aggregated accounting measures (i.e., profit and accounting return measures), disaggregated accounting measures (costs and sales) and non-financial measures (i.e., efficiency, quality and project measures) and relate each measure to the time horizon of division managers. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that all accounting measures focus attention on short run activities, we find that accounting return measures (e.g., return on investment, residual income) lead to a longer-term focus. This result supports prior theoretical and empirical research demonstrating the value of including more complete measures of managerial decisions. Accounting returns not only yield a summary of all pertinent actions they also implicitly or explicitly incorporate the firm's cost of capital and as such better align the manager's actions with the long term interest of the firm. We also find that non-financial and cost measures direct managers' attention away from the short term towards longer-term activities although not to the same extent as accounting return measures do. This finding suggests that it is not necessary to develop non-financial measures to increase the time horizon of managers as disaggregated accounting measures may work just as well.
Senior management will make this choice based on the other costs and benefits associated with these alternatives.
The study is subject to a number of limitations. There is always a concern with the use of survey data to test hypotheses. However, given the importance of matching theory with the level of analysis, we cannot use archival firm-level data to test our hypotheses (Luft and Shields 2003) . We require information at the business unit level and information that is not readily available from any other source but the profit-responsible manager. Using data measured at the business unit level is even more important as management accountants are responsible for providing explanations of accounting-induced management behavior within the firm. There is thus little alternative but to use survey data to answer questions associated with managerial decision-making. The reliance on the findings depends on the care taken in the design of the study to ensure that the measures are valid and reliable. We have taken a number of precautions. First, our method of data collection ensures that we capture data from the relevant source; second we use measures that are as "objective" as possible; third we test, where possible, the construct validity of measures using an alternative measure; and fourth, we use previously tested instruments, where possible, and provide the test results for the psychometric properties associated with each measures. The use of partial least squares allows for measurement error in the reported relations with the test variables.
Notwithstanding these limitations this study adds to our understanding of the effects of performance measures on managerial decision making. We provide a more nuanced view compared with important early work that examined the use of accounting measures and managerial myopia (Merchant 1990; Chow et al. 1996; Van der Stede 2000) . Our findings suggest that concerns over the use of accounting measures in evaluating managerial performance and designing compensation contracts might be overstated. What is important is getting the "balance" right in the choice of control. Given our findings, there is every reason to expect that accounting numbers will continue to play an important role in the design of performance measurement systems and in the writing of compensation contracts.
T A B L E 1 Descriptive Statistics on Sample Business Units and Survey Respondents
The sample consists of 105 observations and information is collected via questionnaire. The survey respondents are business unit managers. The table presents seemingly unrelated partial least squares (PLS) regressions based on 105 observations. Dependent variables are log-ratios of the percentage time spent on long-run vs. short-run activities, medium-run vs. short-run activities, and medium-run vs. long-run activities, respectively. We analyze log-ratios consistent with Aitchison (1986) to account for the compositional nature of our time horizon measure. The log-ratio of long-run vs. short-run activities measures the percentage change in time allocation from short-run towards long-run actions. A similar interpretation follows for the other log-ratios. Independent variables are the weight on a performance measure (accounting returns, profits, costs, sales, and non-financial), decentralization, pay-for-performance sensitivity, as well as size, current performance, growth opportunities, competition, and industry controls. We control for the quasi-compositional nature of our weight on performance measure variables by dropping one category ("other measures") from the analysis, consistent with White et al. (2003) . Only the industry control attains significance (at the 5 percent level or better) in the long/short log-ratio and medium/short log-ratio regressions, but not in the medium/long log-ratio regression. None of the other control variables are significant and we suppress details for brevity. We compute absolute values of t-statistics based on a bootstrapping procedure, which are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
